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Notes and Comment
Constitutional Law:

Civil Rights: Grandfather's Clause. In the

State of Mississippi a majority of the males over twenty-one years of
age, according to the census of 19 io, were colored and this was true also
of South Carolina; in four other states more than one-third of such
males were colored, namely in Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Louisiana. The percentage of illiteracy of native-born white males in said
states ran from 5.1 to 15.61 and of such colored males from 25.9 to
48.3. Prior to 189o colored citizens were frequently disfranchised in
such states by force or fraud. Such methods were inconvenient and
not consonant with the maintenance of due respect for law. In that
year Mississippi put into force a constitution containing the so-called
"understanding" clause excluding from suffrage every man who
had
not paid a poll tax or was "unable to read or write any section of the
constitution of the State" or "to understand the same when read to
him, or give a reasonable interpre ation thereof."' In Williams v.
Mississippi 2 the Supreme Court decided, on writ of error upon conviction for murder, that indictment and conviction by white jurors
who were electors as prescribed by such constitution was not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a denial of the equal protection
of the laws, the provisions not being discriminatory on their face and
the actual administration not having been shown to be discriminatory.
The bolder form of exclusion known as the "grandfather clause" first
appears in the constitution of Louisiana of 1898 providing an educational qualification for the exercise of suffrage, but exempting from
this test all persons ent'tled to vote on Januray ist, 1867, or the
sons or grandsons of such persons, not less than twenty-one at the
date of the adoption of the constitution. 3 .
Apparently this exemption was to avoid disfranchisement of whites
then illiterate, but by later amendment the favored descendants are
exempted who attain twenty-one years not later than 1912. A somewhat similar constitutional provision was adopted in North Carolina
which expired by limitation, Dec. i, i9o8.4 In Alabama, Georgia and
Virginia those exempted from the educational requ'rement were

'Constitution of Mississippi, Art. XII, See. 244.

2170

3

U. S. 214 (1898).

Constitution of Louisiana, Article CXCVI, Sec. 5. J. W. Summers in "The
'Grandfather' Clause," 7 Lawyer & Banker 39, points out somewhat similar
provisions, notably that of the Constitution of Massachusetts, Article XX, held
valid in Stone v. Smith, i59 Mass. 413 (1893) and that of the Constitution of
New Hampshire, Part I, Art. ix as amended 19o2. The Massachusetts provision is, "No person shall have the right to vote, or be eligible to office under
the constitution of this commonwealth, who shall not be able to read the constitution in the English language and write his name; provided, however, that the
provisions of this amendment shall not apply to any person prevented by a
physical disability from complying with its requisitions, nor to any person who
now has the right to vote, nor to any persons who shall be sixty years of age or
upwards
at the time this amendment shall take effect."
4
Constitution of North Carolina, Art. VI, Sec. 4.
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descendants of certain soldiers, including those on either side in the
civil war,5 a type of provision not so obviously directed against the
negroes. Attempts to have the Supreme Court pass on the val dity
of the Alabama provisions failed in Giles v. Harris 6 where the court
held that it had no jurisdiction in equity to compel a board of registers
to enroll certain negroes, both because if the plaintiff's contentions
were sound the entire registration plan was invalid and because the
court could not undertake the task of enforcing political rights; and
also in Giles v. Teasley7 decided on jurisdictional grounds.
The question at issue has now been definitely decided in Guinn v.
'United States8 and Myers v. Anderson9 , holding invalid as in conflict
with the fifteenth amendment provisions of the constitution of
Oklahoma and a statute of Maryland.
The Oklahoma provision adopted in 191o involved in the Guinn
case was as follows:
"No person shall be registered as an elector of this state or be
allowed to vote in any election held herein, unless he be able to read
and write any section of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma;
but no person who was, on January ist, 1866, or any time prior
thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at that
time resided in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such
person, shall be denied the right to register and vote because of his
inability to so read and write sections of such Constitution."' 0
The court says that a literacy test would be valid, reaffirming the
position that the states may fix suffrage standards even in case of elections, as in the Guinn case, for members of Congress." The Court,
however, answers questions certified by Circuit Court of Appeals on a
prosecution of election officers under Section 5508, Revised Statutes,
now section 19, Penal Code, for conspiring to deprive certain negroes
of a right to vote, holding the above constitutional provision invalid.
Mr. Chief Justice White writes the opinion for the entire court (Mr.
Justice McReynolds taking no part 2). The case is of interest:
i. As being the first decision to hold a state law invalid under the
fifteenth amendment. This settles the controversy 13 with reference
to the validity of the amendment, though this had been adjudicated in
Neal v. Delaware.1 4
5Constitution cf Alabama of 9oi, Section i8o; Constitution of Georgia, Art.
II,Sec. i; Constitution of Virginia of 1902, Art. II, Sec. 19.
6189 U. S. 475 (1902).
T193 U. S.146 (1904).
835 Sup. Ct. Rep. 926 (June 21, 1915).
935 Sup. Ct. Rep. 932 (June 21, 1915). This case affirms 182 Fed. -23. The
Oklahoma State Courts had -usteined the Oklahoma provision in Atwater v.
Hassett, 27 Okla. 292 (191o) and Cofield v. Farrell, 38 Okla. 6o8 (1913), Justice
writing careful opinions in both cases.
Williams
'6 Constitution of Oklahoma, Art. III, Sec. 4a.
"Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1874); James v. Bowman, ICO U. S. 127

(1903).

"It is erroneously stat ed that Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred in the decision in ioo Nation 699 and 51 Literary Dig. 5.
"23 H. L. R. 169 and io C. L. R. 416.
141o3 U. S.370 (188o).
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2.
The standard of 1866 as a basis for suffrage, though not in form
relating to race or previous condition of servitude, violates the fifteenth amendment, for, as Mr. Justice White says, to hold otherwise
would be to declare the provisions of the amendment inoperative
'because susceptible of being rendered inapplicable by mere forms
of expression embodying no exercise of judgment and resting upon no
discernible reason other than the purpose to disregard the provisions
of the Amendment by creating a standard of voting which, on its
face, was in substance but a revitalization of conditions which, when
they prevailed in the past, had been destroyed by the self-operative
force of the Amendment."
3. This exemption clause being invalid, the literacy test itself
falls, as it is clear persons embraced in the i866 standard were not to
be subjected to a literacy test.
4. A criminal action under section 5508, Revised Statutes, against
election officers is an available remedy in such a case.15 In Myers v.
Anderson judgments against election officers for money damages
were affirmed on similar facts.
As there are no states other than Oklahoma and Maryland where
a "grandfather" clause, as distinguished from an "old soldier" clause,
exists as applicable to new voters, the decision does not seem to have
as great immediate political effect as might be supposed from comment in the periodical press. 16 The Nation says of the decision "The
whole constitutes a rounded decision of the utmost Constitutional
and political importance. It means as much forward as the Dred
Scott case did backward."'
Alfred Hayes.

Deeds: Covenant of Warranty: Measure of Damages.-In a recent
interesting case the defendant contracted to convey land to a land
company for the sum of $320 and, pursuant to his contract with the
company, conveyed to the plaintiff, the vendee of the land company.
It was held that the plaintiff, failing to get a good title, could recover
$1,280, the amount paid by the plaintiff to the land company. Hunt
v. Hay, 214 N. Y. 578 (1914).
The courts of New York have adopted the early common law rule
that in case of breach of warranty in a deed the measure of damages
is the value of the land at the time of the making of such covenant.'
No damages are allowed for the enhanced value of the land.2 This
rule is a rule of necessity rather than a rule of reason and is adopted"
to protect an innocent grantor from the hardship that might fall upon
him due to the fluctuating value of land. 3 This rule seems to prevail
"5 Cf. United States v. Mosley, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 904.
161oo Nation 699,_5T Literary Dig. s; 110o Outlook 486; 83 Independent 3.
"Nation, supra. For discussion of the subject see "The Latest Phase of Negro
Disfranchisement" by Julien C. Monnet, 26 H. L. R. 42; "The Grandfather
Clause" by Moorfield Storey, 6 Lawyer & Banker 358 and notes in 24 H. L. R.
388 and i C. L. R. 336.
'Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines (N. Y.) ii.
2Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) i.
'Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) i; Staats v. Ten Eyck, 3 Caines (N.Y.)
Ill.
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in the United States, except in a few of the New England States,
where damages are awarded for the value of the land at the time of
the breach. 4 There seems to be no good reason why any distinction
between real and personal property should exist, but the courts have
recognized such a distinction on account of the fluctuating value of
land.
A covenant of warranty of title being a covenant which runs with
the land, the maker may therefore be sued by subsequent grantees
of the land who have been injured by a breach thereof.5 The value
of the property is conclusively presumed to be the consideration of
the sale. By some courts it is held that the measure of damages in
such a case is the consideration paid by the original covenantee and
not the price paid by the plaintiff;6 by others it is the price paid by
the plaintiff, but he can recover no more than the defendant received.7
The latter seems to be the rule generally in this country and is the
rule which prevails in New York. 8
In the principal case the equitable title having passed from the
defendant to the land company by virtue of the contract to convey
and from the land company to the plaintiff, the situation would seem
analogous to one where a remote grantee sues a predecessor in title
upon a covenant of warranty. Applying the rule in New York, it
would seem that the amount of recovery by the plaintiff in the principal case would be the amount of consideration received by the
defendant. The court of appeals, however, took a different view of
the situation and held the defendant liable on his direct covenant.
The question decided in Hunt v. Hay has never arisen before in
New York and there seems to be very little authority in other states
upon this point. There seem to be a few cases that are analogous to
this case. In the case of Cook v. Curtis9 the lots were sold by
Curtis to one Cressy who traded them to Cook for other property.
By an agreement between the three Curtis deeded direct to Cook.
It was held that the consideration to be recovered of the defendant was
what he received for the land and not what the plaintiff may have paid
Cressy. In the case of Staples v. Dean'0 it was held that the amount
received by the defendant was the true measure of damages, if
it could be ascertained; if not, then th&value of the land at the
time of the covenant. It should be noted in this connection that the
measure of damages for breach of a covenant of seisin in Massachusetts is the damages sustained at the time of the covenant. The case
of Browne v. Walcott", approves of the rule in Cook v. Curtis",
4

Cushman v. Blanchard,2Me. 266; Hasford v. Wright, Kirby 3; Diury v.

Shambay, i Am. Dec. 704.
6Geizler v. DeGraaf, 166 N. Y. 339; Rawle on Covenants for Title, Sec. 213

et seq.
6
Laurance v. Robertson, io Rich (S. C.) 8; Hopkins v. Lane, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.)
79; 7 Book v. Black, 68 Miss. I6i.
Jenks v. Quinn, 6i Hun 427, aff'd. 137 N. Y. 223; Crisfield v. Stocrs, 36
Md. 15o; Taylor v. Wallace, 20 Colo. 211.
SJenks v. Quinn, 61 Hun 427, aff'd 137 N. Y. 223.
968 Mich. 611.
0II4 Mass. 125.

nI N . D: 497.

Mich. 611.

868
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but sec. 4584 of the compiled laws of North Dakota covers a case
like the principal one. Graham v. Leslie 13 holds that where the
parties have expressed the consideration in a deed they are estopped
from showing a lesser amount. However, such a rule does not prevail
in this country and the parties may show the actual amount by
parole. 4 Moreover, there are dicta in the' case of McClure v.
McClure"5 to the effect that the defendant might be held liable on
his covenant made directly to the plaintiff.
It would seem, therefore, that the case of Hunt v. Hay is not in
accord with the authority in other states. The argument advanced
by the plaintiff is that the general theory of damages is to place the
plaintiff in as good a position as he was before the covenant and thereby allow him to recover the amount he has paid on the faith of such
covenant. It seems that the arguments on behalf of the defendant
are stronger, as he was bound to convey to the plaintiff, pursuant
to his contract, whereas the plaintiff could have obtained specific
performance against the land company. Having consented to accept
a conveyance from the defendant, it would seem that he would have
no just ground to complain, if he only-recovered the amount of consideration received by the defendant.
Harry Ginsburg.
Divorce: Interpretationof Sec. 1756, NV. Y. Code of Civil Procedure.
-The case of Barber v. Barber, 89 Misc. (N. Y.) 519, presents the
jurisdictional requisites for a divorce decree in New York under
section 1756 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this case the husband and wife were married in New York and then immediately
moved to Pennsylvania where they acquired a residence. The
plaintiff left her husband in Pennsylvania, and at the commencement
of the action for the divorce, and for several years prior thereto, had
lived in New York state. The husband at all times continued to be a
resident of Pennsylvania.
The adultery for which the divorce was sought was committed
by the defendant in the state of New York while on a visit to that
state and while the plaintiff resided there. The summons in the case
was served on the defendant by publication and he did not appear.
The court held that the mere fact of the parties having been married :n New York was not sufficient in itself to give the court jurisdiction over the matrimonial status of the parties. This holding seems
to be directly in contravention of the express wording of the Code of
Civil Procedure, sec 1756, subdivision two, which reads: "In
either of the following cases, a husband or wife may maintain an
action against the other party to the marriage, to procure a judgment
divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage, by reason of the
defendant's adultery. * * * * *
* *
"2.
Where the parties were married within the state."
34 Upper Can. C. P. 176.
"Gavin v. Buckles, 41 Ind. 528.
1565 Ind. 482.
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This is the only decision in New York state that necessarily construes subdivision two above. The court refers to and bases its
decision largely upon the language of Judge O'Brien in Gray v. Gray,'
but there the point was merely passed over because it was unnecessary
to the decision of the case and the dictun was not statedwith positiveness.
Consequently in the principal case the court for its holding must
rest upon the following statement in its opinion: "The presumption
is against the construction contended for. In view of that fact and of
the evil results to follow that construction, * * * * I think the
mere fact of the marriage within the state, irrespective of the residence
of the parties, is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction." In a word,
the court nullifies the express statutory provision. Nevertheless,
this seems to be the common sense view, for surely the mere fact that
the parties came within the state for only long enough to get married
should not give the New York courts jurisdiction over their matrimonial status, irrespective of their domicile. From the creation of the
matrimonial status it does not follow that a matrimonial domicile has
been acquired.
The other issue in Barber v. Barber arose on the interpretation of
subdivisions three and four of sec. I756 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as ollows: "In either of the following cases, a
husband or wife may maintain an action, against the other party to
the marriage, to procure a judgment, divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage, by reason of the defendant's adultery. * * *
3. Where the plaintiff was a resident of the State, when the
offense was committed, and is a resident thereof, when the action is
commenced. '
4. Where the offence was committed within the State, and the injured party, when the action is commenced, is a resident of the State."
The question was, what is the meaning of the word "residence."
The court correctly held that within the meaning of the statute the
word "residence" in divorce proceedings is equivalent to "domicil."?
The domicil of the wife is presumptively that of the husband.3 But
this presumption that the wife's domicil is that of the husband may
be rebutted by proof that the wife left the husband and took up a
bona fide residence elsewhere for reasons which the court deems sufficient to justify her in leaving him. Then the New York courts say,
and they are sustained by the United States Supreme Court in their
contention, 4 that she may acquire a bona fide residence, i. e., domicil,
in New York sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of that
state to give her a divorce decree, without the necessity of securing
personal service of the summons on the defendant, service by publication being deemed sufficient. In this case apparently, the matrimonial domicil of the parties would be destroyed.5
"143 N. Y. 354, 357.
2
De Meli v. De Meli, 12o N. Y. 485.
3Atherton
v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
4

Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562.
'Gray v. Gray, 143 N. Y. 354; Dceme v. Dcerne, 96 N. Y. App. Div. 284,

289.
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The matrimonial domicil having been destroyed, then the state
having personal jurisdiction over one of the parties could determine
that p rty's matrimonial status toward the absent party, within its
own jurisdiction, but such decision would have no extra-territorial
effect, and no other jurisdiction would be compelled to recognize that
decree.6 The inconsistency of the attitude of the New York courts is
clearly shown by a large number of decisions which have repeatedly
refused to recognize such divorce decrees of other states, where the
state grahting the decree has no jurisdiction over the matrimonial
domicil of the parties and has secured no personal jurisdiction of the
defendant; while in exactly the same kind of a case the courts of
New York will grant a divorce and expect other states to recognize
it on the grounds of comity.
Where a state has jurisdiction over the matrimonial domicil of
the parties, other states must recognize a divorce decree of that state,
where the defendant has been only constructively served with the
summons. In such a case the law is now settled, but where the
matrimonial domicil has been destroyed and she has acquired a bona
fide residence in another jurisdiction, or when she has left him for
justifiable cause, and attempts to secure a divorce, there is a great
conflict of authority, and some very absurd results are obtained when
such a decree is granted. Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U. S. 386, is a
typical case. In a state of facts like that stated above, though the
courts of the jurisdiction in which one party has acquired a bona fide
residence can grant a decree valid within its own borders, as previously stated, such decree would have no extra-territorial effect, and
the party to whom such decree is given, or the party against whom it
is given, on a subsequent marriage in another jurisdiction could there
be prosecuted for bigamy. For this state of affairs there should be
some remedy provided.
The following question apparently has not, up to the present time,
been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, namely,
when the husband deserts the wife in one jurisdiction, does the
matrimonial domicil of the marriage remain with the wife while she
is within the jurisdiction or has it been destroyed?
It certainly seems that there is urgent need of a uniform divorce
law throughout the country or as Justice Laughlin said in Ransom v.
Ransom", "It would seem that the Legislature of our own state at
least, should revise the Laws with respect to granting divorces and
confine the authority of the court to cases where jurisdiction can be
obtained which will insure the validity of the divorce not only in the
state where granted, but in every other state." And as Justice
Crouch said in the opinion of the principal case," It seems reasonably
clear, that the divorce statute is in need of overhauling in other
respects,

*

*

*

*

particularly subdivision two, section 1756 of

the Code of Civil Procedure."
H. S. Bareford.
6

Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562.
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.
N. Y. App. Div. 915.

7
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Employer's Liability: Definition of Interstate Commerce.-The
case of Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 214 N. Y. 413 (I915),
apparently sets a limit beyond which the New York courts will not
go in holding an employee within the terms of the federal employers'
liability act of 908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149). The plaintiff in
this case was generally employed on a "shaping-machine" making
small parts used in the repair of locomotives, used both in interstate
and intrastate traffic. At the time of his injury he was engaged in
shifting the counter-shaft which supplied power to his machine in
order to make room for another machine. He brought suit under the
federal act. The question arose, "Was he engaged in interstate
commerce at the time of his injury?" This is always a crucial question under the federal act, for, though the act also speqifies that the
defendant railroad must be engaged in interstate commerce, if the
employee was engaged in interstate commerce, the railroad must
necessarily have been so engaged, since the employee is the servant of
the railroad. On the other hand, if the employee was not engaged in
interstate commerce, the fact that the railroad was so engaged does
not aid him. The holding was that the plaintiff was not engaged in
interstate commerce.
"Interstate traffic," as distinguished from the broader term,
"interstate commerce," may be defined as the transportation of freight
and passengers between the several states. Employees engaged in
the actual act of such transportation are obviously within the Federal
Act and the courts have so held even when the interstate traffic is
inseparably bound up with intrastate traffic.1
Most of the other cases where the injured employee has been held
entitled to the benefits of the federal act have been cases in which
he was engaged in the repair of instrumentalities used either in interstate traffic or indiscriminately in interstate and intrastate traffic.
Such- instrumentalities include engines, engine-tenders, bridges4,
'The following, have been held to be within the federal act; a switchman
engaged in switching both interstate and intrastate cars; Pittsburgh C. C. & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Glynn, 219 Fed. 148 (195); contra, Illinois Centr. R. Co. v. Behrens,
233 U. S. 4 (1913): a trucker engaged in loading a car destined for interstate
traffic; Illinois Centr. R. Co. v. Porter, 207 Fed. 311 (1913); a brakeman on an
interstatetrain; SecondEmployer'sLiability Cases, 223 U S. . (I9x ); even though
he is engaged in cutting intrastate cars out of the train; Carrv. N. Y. Centr. &
H. R., 77 Misc. 346 (1912); affirmed, i57 App. Div. 941; contra, Van Brimmer v.
Texas & P. Ry. Co., 190 Fed. 394 (19n): an engineer switching interstate cars;
Barlow v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 214 N. Y. 116 (1915): a fireman on his way to
join an interstate crew; Lamphere v. Oregon R. & M. Co., 196 Fed. 336 (1912):
an engineer on an interstate run to whose engine the interstate cars have not yet
been coupled; No. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 (1914).
2Law v. Illinois Centr. R. Co., 2o8 Fed. 869 (1913).
3Darr
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 197 Fed. 665 (1912).
4
Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W., 229 U. S. 146 (x913); Thompson v. Columbia
&P. R. Co., 205 Fed. 203 (1913); contra, Taylor v. Southern Ry. Co., 178 Fed.
380 (i910).
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tracks and roadbed 5 , switches6 , freight sheds7 , and cars8 . The
leading case in this class is the Pedersen case9 where the plaintiff was
injured while carrying bolts from a tool car to a bridge, used both in
interstate and intrastate traffic, then undergoing repairs. He was
held to be under the federal act on the theory that such work was
indispensable to interstate traffic.
The Shanks case is obviously an attempt to extend the doctrine
of the Pedersen cases to all cases where an injury to the employee will
have a detrimental effect on interstate traffic. Under such a rule
the mining of coal would come under the federal act, for coal is
indispensable to interstate traffic and an injury to a miner might conceivably be a detriment to such traffic. Coal mining ,however, can
scarcely be said to have been within the contemplation of the framers
of the federal act. 10 It should be noticed that the prevailing opinion, in holding that Shanks was not engaged in interstate commerce,
held that he was not repairing his machine, while the dissenting opinion went on the ground that he was repairing it. Under this decision
it is possible that, if Shanks had been operating his machine or had
been making "necessary repairs" upon it, he would have been held to
be under the federal act.
The Matter of Parsons v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 167 App. Div.
536 (1915), should be noted in this connection.

This case concerns an

application for compensation under the workman's compensation
law' by an employee who was injured while repairing in a repair shop
a freight car that was used indiscriminately in interstate and intrastate traffic. The court held that he was not engaged in interstate
commerce and was entitled to the benefits of the state act, on the
theory that "the true test is the nature of the work being done at the
time of the injury." This case seems to draw a distinction between
repairs in the shop and repairs to bridges and tracks and "running
repairs"'12. If followed, this case will decidedly cut down the field
covered by the federal act and correspondingly increase that covered
by the. state act.
L. I. Shelley.
Fixtures: Constructive Severance by Contract of Sale.-In the case
of Melton and Son *v.Fullerton-Weaver Realty Co., 214 N. Y. 571,
recently decided by the court of appeals, the defendant, FullertonWeaver Realty Co., was the owner of a five story and basement brick
apartment house and the plaintiffs, Melton and Son, were in the business of wrecking buildings. The defendant planned to erect a new
5
Tralich v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 217 Fed. 675 (1914); San Pedro L. A.
& S. L. Co. v. Davide, 21o Fed. 870 (1914); Zikos v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., i79
Fed.6 893 (191o); Lombardo v. Boston & M. R. R., 223 Fed. 427 (1915).
7Central R. of N. J. v. Colsurdo, 192 Fed. 9Ol (i911).
Eng v. Southern Pac. Co., 21o Fed. 92 (1913).
sNorthern I ac. Ry. Co. v. Markl, 198 Fed. i (1912); contra, Heinbach v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 197 Fed. 579 (1912); Parsons v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
167 9N. Y. App. Div. 536 (1915).
Pedersen v. Delaware L. & W., 229 U. S. 146 (1913).
10
Delaware, L. & W. v. Yurknois, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 902 (1915).
uConsol. Laws, chap. 67; Laws of 1914, chap. 41.
12
See also Darr v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 197 Fed. 665 (1912).
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building on the premises where the apartment house stood. On June
3 d, i9II, defendant entered into an agreement in writing and under
seal with the plaintiffs, that, for the consideration of $900, the
plaintiffs could have the building and its contents with the exception
of one boiler. The plaintiffs agreed to tear down the buildings and
remove all of the materials down to the level of the cellar. The
plaintiffs commenced work June 5, 191i

and on July 25,

191i

the

building was removed to the street level. The plaintiffs continued
until July 28 or 29, 1911,. when they were ejected by the defendant
and another contractor was employed to finish the work. The
plaintiffs brought an action in conversion to recover the value of the
material which they were not permitted to remove.
The court held that it was competent for parties to contract that
one be the owner of the buildings and another the owner of the land
on which the buildings stand. In the principal case there was an
absence of any claim of interest by mortgagees, lessees or parties
interested in any manner in the realty, except the buyer and seller
of the house. The court held that when the title became vested in
the plaintiffs the building was constructively severed and they could
recover in conversion for the old material which they had not actually
severed.
On principle this case seems to have been correctly decided. The
material out of which the building was erected was personalty, but
after the construction of the building it lost its identity as such and
acquired the character of realty.'
Nevertheless, it is competent for parties by contract so to regulate
their respective interests that one may be the owner of the building
and another the owner of the land.2 This result may be reached either
by contracting that an article which is to be attached to real property
shall remain the personal property of another than the landowner or
by contracting that an article already attached to realty shall resume
its original character as personalty. This latter agreement amounts
to a conversion of thefixture into a personal chattel without immediate
physical detachment of it from the realty. But, in order to convey
the legal title to a fixture, when there has been no actual severance or
physical detachment, the contract must be in writing and
be executed
3
with the formality required for a conveyance of realty.
The contract in the principal case complied with the requirements
4
of the statute of frauds, since it was in writing and under seal.
The fixture became personalty after the making of the contract
for severance but before actual severance and, since the plaintiffs
got a valid title to the house, they became the owners of personal
property.5
'Dutton v. Ensley, 51 N. E. 380; Madigan v. McCarthy, io8 Mass. 376;
Lipsky
v. Borgman, 9 N. W. 158.
2
People ex. rel. Van Nest et al. v. Commissioners, 8o N. Y. 573; People ex.
rel.3Muller v. Board of Assessors, 93 N. Y. 308.
Johnston v. Philadelphia Mortgage and Trust Co., 129 Ala. 515; Dudley v.
Foote, 63 N.H. 57: Leonard v. Clough, 133 N. Y. 292; Meyersv. Schemp, 67111.
469.4
New York Real Pioperty Law, section 242.
5
Tyson v. Post, io8 N. Y. 217.
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The case of Long v. White, 42 Ohio State 59, is in point. The
court there held "that buildings are realty or personalty, according to
the intention of the parties, and when parties in interest agree that
they may be severed and moved from the realty, buildings are held
and treated as personalty." Shaw v. Carbrey, 13 Allen (Mass.) 462,
is also in point. The court there held "that buildings which are
sold without the lands on which they stand, with the intention of all
parties to sever them from the land, pass to the purchaser, with a right
to remove them as personal property within a reasonable time."
According to secticon i56 of the New York Personal Property Law,
(section 76 of the uniform sales act), which went into effect September i, igi, only a few months after the contract involved in the
principal case was made, the word "goods" is defined as including
"emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or
forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale
or under the contract .of sale." This statute lays down a rule which
reaches the same result as that reached in the Melton case, but on
different grounds. The house was obviously a thing "attached to or
forming a part of the land," which was agreed to be severed under the
contract of sale. It was, therefore, under the sales act, "goods"
under the contract for its sale and conversion would be the proper
action to brix.g for the refusal to allow the materials to be taken. The
Melton case allowed conversion because the house had been changed
from real to personal property by a contract complying with the real
property section of the statute of frauds. The sales act would
allow conversion in a similar case because the house was personal
property as the subject of the contract for sale and severance and the
personal property section of the statute of frauds had been satisfied.
Apparently a change in the attitude of the courts towards fructus
naturales and fixtures will be necessary as a result of the adoption of
the sales act.
Herman B. Lermer.
Landlord and Tenant: Termination of Tenancies from Month to
Month.-The uncertainty of the state of the law as to the length of
notice necessary to terminate a tenancy "from month to month" is
illustrated in the recent New York case of Mandel v. Kcerner, 90
Misc. 9.
The landlord, Mandel, failed in his business, that of a private
banker in New York City, and the superintendent of banks took
possession on August 4, 1914.

According to the agreed statement

Kcerner occupied apartments belonging to Mandel, as a tenant from
month to month, but it was not stated when the agreement was made.
Koerner was a depositor in Mandel's bank and seeks to offset the
September rent against his deposits. The question to be decided was
whether the rent due for September existed as a debt on August 4,
when the bank was closed. Since it does not appear in the statement
when the agreement was made, no debt is shown to have existed on
August 4 and so the rent could not be offset against the deposit.
This was one of many similar cases and the court for that reason said
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in regard to such tenancies from month to month as were made prior
to August 4; "Where there is a tenancy from month to month, the
landlord must give the tenant thirty days' notice to quit and the
mutual obligation rests on the tenant to give the same notice to the
landlord."
A clear understanding of the distinction between "monthly"
tenancies and tenancies "from month to month" is necessary for this
discussion, a distinction which many of the courts seem not to
appreciate. Where a tenant holding for one month, a definite and
determined period of time, holds over his term without objection
from the landlord a monthly tenancy is created. In such a case a
new lease is presumed for each month with the same terms as the
original lease and no notice is necessary, for a tenancy for a definite
length of time terminates automatically at the end of that time.
A tenancy from month to month is one of uncertain duration, that
is, it is for one month and'for an indefinite number of months thereafter until notice of termination. Such a tenancy is also presumed
when there is a parol lease for more than a year or a lease for any
other reason void under the statute of frauds and a monthly rent is
reserved. In some states statutes define other circumstances by
which tenancies from month to month are created.'
The purpose of this note is to discuss the state of the law at present
on the question of the length of notice necessary to terminate a
tenancy of this kind.
In general the notice required to terminate a periodic tenancy is
equal to the period of that tenancy. According to this rule, then, a
month's notice is required to terminate a tenancy from month to
month and the requirement of notice is reciprocal, binding both landlord and tenant.2 In states where statutes prescribe the length of
notice which shall be necessary the rule is generally made to work to
the mutual advantage of both parties. 3
In a great majority of the cases notice of either one month or thirty
days is required and in most of these states the difference between the
two has not been seriously considered. In some states, however, the
difference has been discussed and, of eighteen states where the question has been brought up, ten mention one month as the proper time
and eight hold to thirty days.
Even those holding that one month is the proper notice are not
uniform in their requirements. In New Jersey, where the requirement is one month, the courts hold that, when a tenancy commenced
'Withnellv. Petzold, 104 MO. 409; Corbett v. Cochrane, 67 Conn.570; Rothschild v. Williamson, 83 Ind. 387.
2Lockwood v. Lockwood, 22 Conn. 425; Brownell v. Welch, 91 Ill.
523; Arbenz
v. Exley, Watldns & Co., 52 W. Va. 476; Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5 N. Y. App.
Div.
3 590.
1n Kansas, where the statutes provide only for notice by the landlord, the
courts have held that the common law requirement of notice on the vart of the
tenant has been entirely superseded by the statute and that notice by the tenant
is not necessary (Nelson v.Ware, 57 Kan. 670), while in Illinois, though the statute
requires the landlord to give a thirty days' notice in writing the court holds that
the common law requirement of one month's verbal notice is still applicable to the
tenant and that such a notice is sufficient. Eberlein v. Abel, ioIll. App. 626.
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on the r 3 th of a month, the day of termination would be the i 3 th of
month
some succeeding month, and a notice given on that date of any
4
would be sufficient to terminate it on the i 3 th of the next.
The court in Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128, holds that a notice
given on the first of the month is sufficient to terminate a tenancy*on
the first of the following month and justifies its theory by saying that
"the law is ignorant of fractions of a day." A notice given on the
first of the month may be considered as applicable to every period of
the day so that "the very moment the tenancy expires the tenant is
confronted with a notice to quit." "On what process of reasoning,"
the court continues, "can it be said that a new tenancy has commenced
before notice is given?" In opposition to this, the Minnesota court
clearly takes the view that the tenancy expires on the last rather than
on the first of the month and that the notice must be served on the
last of the preceding month.
In Searle v. Powell, 89 Minn. 278, the notice served on May 31st
demanded that the premises be delivered up on the first of July following. "Because the landlord conceded that he might have until the
next day to vacate, granting him afavorin this respect, is no sufficient
reason why the tenant should be permitted to take technical advantage of his kindness and good will. By this notice the tenancy was
terminated as of the last day of June." The following appears in
Corby v. Book & Stationery Co., 76 Mo. App. 5o6, "The written
notice must be served on the other party before the beginning of the
succeeding or last rental month." 5
In New York there are cases supporting nearly all of the views
expressed above and in many of them it is difficult to tell what principle is laid down, for the rule stated applies only to a particular state
of facts. The general rule in New York seems to be that the common
law requirement of one month's notice shall be enforced.'
Much of the trouble in this state arises from the confusion of the
monthly tenancies and the tenancies from month to month. These
words appear in the case of Gibbons v. Dayton, 4 Hun, 451: "It is
very clear that the tenancy of the intestate was from month to month.
Neither party was bound to give any notice to the other in order
to terminate the tenancy at the expiration of any month," and later,
"in this case the express terms of the lease are'that this term of letting
and hiring is for one month only and will expire' at noon on the first
day of the following month." In this case no notice was required.
From the description of the tenancy this was the correct holding
4
Baker
5

v. Kenny, 69 N. J. L. i8o.
Supporting this view are: Williams v. McAnany, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. i9i;
Drey v. Doyle, 28 Mo. App. 249. In the later Missouri case of Gerhart Realty
Co. v. Weiter, io8 Mo. App. 248, the court refers to sec. 411o, Revised Statutes
1899, as requiring thirty days' notice to quit. That section, however, clearly provides for one month's notice and so the case is of little importance except to illustrate
the looseness with which some of these terms are used.
6
Hoffman v. Van Allen, 3 Misc. 99; Burckle v. Adams Bros. Co., 59 App. Div.
IO9; People v. Darling, 47 N. Y. 666; Elingenstein v. Goldwasser, 27 Misc. 536;
Hungerford v. Wagoner, 5 App. Div. 59o; Geiger v. Braun, 6 Daly 5o6; Contra, Gilfoyle v. Cahil, i8 Misc. 68.
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but to call such a tenancy one from month to month is a clear misnomer. Again in People v. Goelet, 64 Barb. 476: "He testified that
the renting was by the month and to be from month to month. There
can be but one interpretation, viz., that to be continued, it must be
renewed monthly. The contract for August was to the first of September. * * * It contained no agreement for extending it beyond
that time, and left the contract as originally made, to be from month
to month." As in the former case no notice was required to terminate
the tenancy. In both, the description corresponds to that of a
monthly tenancy. With this in view and keeping in mind the fact
that the naming of the tenancy by the court was error, the apparent
conflict of many of the authorities is cleared.
The legislature of New York has left the question to its common
law determination except for a limited qualification in the city of
New York. Section 232 of the Real Property Law, providing that
the indefinite rentings in the city of New York shall be deemed to
continue to the first of May next after the possession commences
under the agreement, seems to apply to true tenancies from month to
month.

The case of Olson v. Schevlovitz, 91 App. Div. 405, is some-

times cited as contrary to this, but this is a case of a monthly tenancy
and clearly the statute would not apply to that, for it is for a determined length of time. Chapter 352 of the laws of 1889 requires a five
days' notice in writing to be served in order to terminate a monthly
tenancy. The statute does not purport to affect a tenancy from
month to month. "The five days' notice thus required was designed
for the protection of the tenant, and not to interfere with the common
law rights of a tenant that existed prior to the passage of the statute."
Bent v. Renken, 86 N. Y. S. iio.
It appears, then, that out of the conflict of authorities in the various
states and in New York this principle stands out most clearly; that
to terminate a tenancy "from month to month" a month's notice
must be given on or before the last day of the period in order to terminate the tenancy on the last day of the succeeding period. The weight
of authority seems to reject the view that a tenancy from month to
month, begun on the first of the month, will terminate on the first of
some succeeding month, but rather supports the rule, which is by far
more reasonable, that the tenancy will nd on the last of some month.
In reality, and dispensing with legal fictions, the notice must be served
on the last day of the month in order that a new month may not be
started before notice is given. This view, supported by common
sense and the law should be more universally followed.7
Don C. Allen.
Marriage: Annulment for Fraud.-Recent decisions in the New
York courts bring into prominence the question of what amounts to
fraud as a ground for the annulment of marriage. Sobol v. Sobol, 88
Hart v. Lindley, 5o Mich. 2o; Corby v. Book & Stationery Co., 76 Mo. App.
506; Drey v. Doyle, 28 Mo. App. 249; Searle v. Powell, 89 Minn. 278; Williams
v. McAnany, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 191; Olson v. Schevlovitz, 91 App. Div. 405.
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277, held, where the defendant concealed from the plaintiff the
fact that he had tuberculosis, saying that he had a cold, that "any
misrepresentation of a material fact incidental to the contract of
marriage is sufficient to avoid it" and annulled the marriage. Bahrenburgv. Bahrenburg, 88 Misc. 272, held, where the defendant misrepresented to the plaintiff that her child was legitimate under a former
marriage and subsequently married the plaintiff, that the marriage
was not voidable for fraud, for the reason that the plaintiff did not
prove his ignorance of the illegitimacy of the child. Robert v.
Robert, 87 Misc. 629, held, where the defendant induced the plaintiff
to marry him by suggesting that they pool their money to buy a hotel
and where, upon receiving the plaintiff's money, the defendant
deserted the plaintiff, that the marriage was voidable for fraud.
Equity has long had inherent jurisdiction to annul a marriage for
fraud', but at present this jurisdiction is usually expressed or added
to by statute. In cases of annulment for this cause marriage is
looked upon as a civil contract and as such is voidable, but, because of
the interest of the public in the matrimonial status, a high degree of
proof should be required to annul the contract 2. If, when the relation
is entered into, the parties are competent to make a contract and
competent to perform the duties which the contract involves and
physically able to meet its obligations, nothing more is required.
The early history of annulment of the marriage contract for fraud
shows a great reluctance on the part of the courts to dissolve the
marital relation for this cause, the analogy to a civil contract not being
complete. Even now in England gross fraud can not make a marriage voidable. 3 But the present New York decisions show a tendency to render more comprehensive the scope of fraud as a ground
for annulment and in cases where there are no children, is no consumation, no creation of debts, no establishment of a status in the
community, or change in property interests, the courts are less reluctant to annul. 4 The leading case of di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174
N. Y. 467, enunciates the broad rule that "Public Policy is concerned
with the regulation of the family relation; nevertheless, our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. * * *
every misrepresentation of a material fact, made with the intention
to induce another to enter into an agreement, and without which he
would not have done so, justifies the court in vacating the agreement."
Such misrepresentation must, however, be such that if it had not been
practiced, the parties deceived would not have consented to the contract. Furthermore, the fraud must be such as would deceive an
ordinarily prudent man and the one deceived is bound to have
investigated the circumstances within reason.
The fraud required to avoid the marital status is measured by two
fundgmental tests, namely, first, its materiality must go to the con-

Misc.

'Fisk v. Fisk, 6 ApD. Div. 432.
2Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 54.
3

Moss v. Moss, (1897) Probate 263.
Sobol v. Sobol, 88 Misc. 277.

4
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sent to the contract and does not apply to the capacity to performS;
and second, after discovery of the fraud, there must be no condonation
by continued co-habitation or otherwise. 6 The application of these
tests shows that various concealments or representations may amount
to fraud; for example, concealment of incurable or venereal disease7 .
Generally concealment of unchastity on the part of the wife
previous to the marriage is no ground for annulment and the same
rule applies in the case of antenuptial misconduct of the husband.
Glean v. Glean, 7o App. Div. 576, holds that "marriage covers with
oblivion antenuptial incontinence and lapses from virtue." Domschke
v. Domschke, 138 App. Div. 454, holds, however, that, if the marriage
was conditioned upon chastity, the concealment of unchastity is fraud
which makes such contract voidable.
Pregnancy of the wife at the time of the marriage is fraud, it being
held that the husband should not be required to take an illegitimate
into his family or have his wife incapacitated for any period, however
brief.8 But if the husband has meretricious relations with his wife
previous to marriage, and is induced to marry her upon false representations that he is the father of her illegitimate child, he is not in a
position to plead fraud9. But to this last statement there are two
cases which are exceptions. In Scott v. Schufeldt, 5 Paige Ch. 43,
the defendant gave birth to a child, which she represented to the
plaintiff as being his, thereby inducing marriage. After the marriage
the plaintiff claimed that he found the child was of negro blood and
the court indicated that, if proper proof of the plaintiff's claim was
made, the marriage was voidable for fraud. In di Lorenzo v. di
Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, the defendant procured a child in the plaintiff's absence, and on his return falsely represented the child to
be the plaintiff's. The marriage subsequently entered into was
avoided for fraud. It will be noticed that in the two cases last mentioned, while the relations preceding the marriages were illicit, the
represe itations were obviously false, which 'nay be a possible ground
for distinction from the ,ase where the fatherhood is only putative in
nature.
Marriage may be annulled because of the previous conviction of
either consort for felony. 10 In the case last referred to the defendant
had been convicted of larceny. The use of gross trickery or deceit
is also a ground for annulment, as in Robert v. Robert, 87 Misc.
629. In Moot v. Moot, 37 Hun 288, defendant induced an immature girl to marry him by falsely representing that he had obtained
her parents' consent and the marriage was avoided. In Hides v.
Hides, 65 How. Pr. i7,defendant induced voidable marriage with
'Domschke
v. Domschke, 138 App. Div. 454.
6
Svenson v. Svenson, x78 N. Y. 54.
'Sobol v Sobol, 88 Misc. 277; Anonymous, 21 Misc. 765, holding that "The
wife as well as the husband has the right to offspring, and a fraud which conceals
his disability to discharge his proper functions towards that end should entitle
her 8to release," and that concealment of venereal disease is such fraud.
Schrady v. Logan, 17 Misc. 329.
9
Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. 218.
1
Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355.
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an aged man by imposing on his credt hty by means of pretended
admonitions from spirits.
Fraud sufficient to warrant the annulment of a marriage should be
of a degree commensurate with the importance of the marriage
status. Misrepresentations as to character, rank, fortune, ordinary
sickness, and affection are insufficient."

But at the same time the

present general trend in New York is toward an increased liberality
in the allowance of an annulment for fraud. The case of di Lorenzo
v. di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, opened up a large field. In addition the
later decisions above cited, notably Robert v. Robert, in avoiding
marriage for fraud, have nearly, if not actually, reduced the marriage
contract to the level of a mere civil agreement.
George H. Hall.
Marriage: Common-law Marriagein New York: Effect of Statutory Attempt to Modify it.-It must seem strange to the layman that,
by the common law, if a man and woman agree presently to take each
other for husband and wife, it is ipsum matrimonium. The facility
with which the status is formed contrasts most singularly with its
indissolubility when established. To uphold it is to pave the way
for the adventuress to claim the rights of the conmon law widow, particularly after the death of a man of wealth; if its validity is denied,
society may find itself burdened with the care of children under the
disabilities and disgrace of bastardy. These are the two pictures and
society must choose between them. The arguments, pro and con,
can better be addressed to the legislator and student of sociology.
The lawyer is interested more especially with the law as it is. Whether
the common law marriage, after attempts to modify it by statute, is
again legal in New York, it is the purpose of this note to inquire.
The early New York common law always recognized the validity
of the informal or so-called common law marriage. By it marriage
was said to be a civil contract, differing from other civil contracts
only in that it could not be rescinded at the will of the parties. The
early New York courts seem not to have distinguished between the
marriage contract and the status of marriage. As a matter of fact,
marriage is not a contract at all, but a status which springs into being
through the operation of contract.' A valid marriage might exist
without any formal solemnization, without the presence of a magistrate
or clergyman or the sanction of a church. The only requisite for its
validity was a contract per verba de presenti, the deliberate consent of
competent parties entering into a present agreement to be husband
and wife.' After the free expression of mutual and present consent,
cohabitation was not essential. 3
Mutual promises to marry, contracts per verba de futuro, are
executory, and even when followed by intercourse were never held in
nAnonymous, 21 Misc. 765; Riley v. Riley, 73 Hun. 575 (ordinary sickness);
Schaffer v. Schaffer, 16o App. Div. 48 (lack of affection).
'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. i9O (1887).
TFenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 51 (28O9); Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. Y. 23o (185o).
3Davis v. Davis, 7 Daly (N. Y.) 3o8 (1877).
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this state to constitute marriage in fact. Whatever indiscretions the
parties may commit after making such executory promises, they do
not become husband and wife until they actually give themselves to
otherwise there would be no seduction
each other in that relation;
4
and no breach of promise.
Except in prosecutions for bigamy or actions for criminal conversation, the informal marriage contract could be proved either by express
words or by proof of other facts from which it could be inferred or
presumed. Fenton v. Reed, supra. Thus it might be established
by proof of a matrimonial cohabitation, declarations of the parties,
reputation of marriage among friends and neighbors, and recognition
by the parties of each other as holding that relation. While these
facts did not constitute marriage, they evidenced it, because they
were circumstances which usually attended and characterized that
relation, and permitted the court to infer that the parties actually
entered into a marriage contract when the cohabitation commenced.
In this way a prior actual marriage could be presumed, even though
there was a subsequent ceremonial marriage. So evidence of a
general repute was admissible and of a divided repute; but in the
latter case, the evidence admitted could not exceed the range of
knowledge of the cohabitation, else it would be mere hearsay.' These
rules are predicated upon the competency of the parties to enter into
the civil contract. 6 Mere reputation, when admissible, was always
regarded as the weakest kind of evidence. Since marriage could be
inferred only from a matrimonial cohabitation, cohabitation and
repute merely did not constitute marriage. An agreement to be
presently husband and wife was an absolute and vital prerequisite to a
valid marriage; merely living together as such was not sufficient.'
But this rule did not prevent proof of marriage by circumstantial
evidence and a preponderance of evidence was all that was necessary.
The presumption of marriage from cohabitation apparently
matrimonial is one of the strongest known to the law and this is
especially true in cases involving legitimacy. The rule obtains even
where the cohabitation was meretricious in its origin, if there is any
evidence upon which to predicate a change from the meretricious to a
matrimonial relationship. The law presumes morality, not immorality; marriage and not concubinage; legitimacy and not bastardy.
Where there are sufficient facts to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and
satisfactory evidence."
The difficulty in the proof of marriage naturally arises from equivocal facts which give rise to conflicting presumptions. Two classes
of cases most frequently arise; first, where parties, competent to contract, cohabit with no intention to contract a marriage; second,
4

Cheney v. Arnold, 15 N. Y. 345 (1857).
Betsinger v. Chapman, 88 N. Y. 487 (1882); Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y.
184 (872); Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 546 (1882); Matter of Brush, 25 App.
(N. Y.) 6io (1898).
Div.
6
7Dietrich v. Dietrich, 128 App. Div. (N. Y.) 564 (1908).
Matter of Hamilton, 76 Hun. (N. Y.) 2oo (1894).
8
Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451 (1883).
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where parties, incompetent to contract, actually do intend to contract. The wide difference in the proof of these two classes of cases
has obliged the courts to recognize a well defined distinction between
illicit relations, forbidden because of an undisclosed disability on the
part of one or both of the parties thereto, and such relations as are
mutually meretricious, involving on the part of each party knowledge
that its charaoter is not, and is not intended to be, matrimonial.
While either of these two cases may result in marriage, no presumption of a contract of marriage can be raised where its direct consequence is to involve both parties in the crime of bigamy. 9 The presumptions applicable to these two classes of cases will now be considered:
I. Evidence that the cohabitation was meretricious in its origin
rebuts the presumption of marriage; and a meretricious relation, once
begun, is presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. 10 In
such a case a marriage will not be presumed from cohabitation and
repute, but proof of a subsequent actual marriage must be had. This
proof may be by circumstantial evidence, but it must be such as to
exclude the presumption that the former relation continued and to
prove satisfactorily that it was changed at some time into that of
In Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y.

actual marriage by mutual consent."

1o9

(1889), where the intercourse was meretricious at first and subsequently assumed a matrimonial character surrounded by the evidences
of a valid marriage, it was held to be a question for the jury whether or
not there had been at some time a valid marriage. Judge Vann, writing the opinion, said, "It is sufficient if the acts and declarations of
the parties, their reputation as married people and the circumstances
surrounding them in their daily lives, naturally lead to the conclusion
that, although they began to live together as man and mistress, they
finally agreed to live together as husband and wife." In cases
involving legitimacy the fact of continued cohabitation with its
attending matrimonial appearances may be so strong as to compel the
presumption of marriage as a matter of law. 12

More evidence and

evidence of a great deal stronger character is required to prove a marriage to a loose and licentious woman than to a chaste, delicate and
refined woman.1'
II. Where the parties come together under a contract which is
void for the reason that one of the parties is under a disability to
contract, which fact is unknown to the other party, a subsequent
marriage is presumed as a matter of law from acts of recognition, continued cohabitation matrimonial in character, and general repute,
after the removal of the disability. The marriage is presumed to
have taken place at the time of the removal of the disability and it is
I

gFoster v. Hawley, 8 Hun. (N. Y.) 68 (r876).
Fagan v. Fagan, 32 N. Y. State Reporter 994 (1900).
"Bates v. Bates, 7 Misc. (N. Y.) 547 (1894); Caujolle v. Ferrie,
(1861).
"Matter of Spink, 62 Misc. (N. Y.) 158 (1909).
13
Be11 v. Clark, 45 Misc. (N. Y.) 272 (1904).
1

23

N. Y. 90
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not important that either party should know of such removal. 14 In
Matter of Schmidt, supra, a child born during the period of disability was held legitimatized by the presumed marriage of the
parents after the removal of the disability.
The common law marriage as affected by the statutes. Before January i, 1902, there could be no question as to the validity of the socalled common lawmarriage in this state. It was manifestly recognized by the early common law and this sanction was made statutory
by the laws of 1896, ch. 272, section io, which section restated the
doctrine of the common law that marriage was a civil contract, and
then provided, "This article does not require any marriage to be
solemnized in the manner herein specified, and a lawful marriage contracted in the manner heretofore in use in this state. . . is as
valid as if this article had not been enacted." Section ii of this act
had this introductory clause, "For the purpose of being registeredand
authenticatedasprescribedby this article,a marriage must be solemnized
by either," etc., and then provided for the filing of the marriage certificate." Common law marriages were here expressly allowed.
The laws of I9OI, ch. 339, section io, however, repealed the above
express permission contained in the law of I896, struck out the introductory clause to section i i, supra, made this section then read, "A
marriage must be solemnized by either," etc., and then added a 4 th
sub-division providing for a marriage by a written contract signed and
acknowledged by the parties and witnessed in the manner required
for the acknowledgement of a conveyance of real property, to entitle
the same to be recorded, which contract must be recorded within six
months. This act of igoi also added a new section numbered ig
which provided, "That no marriage claimed to have been contracted
on or after January x, 1902, within this State, otherwise than in this
article provided, shall be valid for any purpose whatever." This act
of 1961 thus expressly prohibited the common law marriage.
This act, however, was amended in part and repealed in part by
the laws of 1907, ch. 742.

Section 5 of this act provided simply," Mar-

riage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be a civil
contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law in (sic)making
a contract is essential." This clause was contained in all the statutes
from the very first, but here it stood alone. Section xi of the act of
igoi was renumbered and amended by section 6 of the act of 1907 to
read after the first word "recorded," "provided, however, that all
such contracts of marriage must, in order to be valid," be acknowledged
before a judge of a court of record." This act repealed all other provisions of the act of I9OI, including section

19,

the express prohibi-

tory clause, and made certain provisions with reference to marriage
licenses. Section i8 provided that copies of the records of marriages
and all other records pertaining thereto duly certified by the clerk
14Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, (N. Y.) 573 (1841); Fenton v. Reed, supra; Matter

of Schmidt, 42 Misc. (N. Y.) 463 (1904); Townsend v. Van Buskirk, 33 Misc.
(N. Y.) 287 (i9OO); Geiger v. Ryan, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 722 (I9O8); Matter
of Wells, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79 (1908).
"The italics are the writer's.
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of the county where the same are recorded under his official seal
shall be evidence in all courts. The sections being renumbered as
they were in the law of 1896, this act was enacted into the Consolidated Laws, and is now a part of the Domestic Relations Law.
The result of the statutory changes has been to cast doubt upon
the validity of the common law marriage in this state. The opinion
seems to prevail in the lower courts, however, that the common law
marriage by oral contract is again legal, since the repeal of the express
prohibition left the statutes with no express words of nullity." The
Matter of Smith, supra, held that although a common law marriage
by oral contract was impossible while section 19 of the laws of 1901, the
express prohibitory clause, was in force, still such a marriage may be
had since the repeal of that section by thelaws of 1907, notwithstanding
that the Domestic Relations Law specifies particular formalities for
the solemnization of marriage. Such formal provisions are construed
as directory merely and not as being destructive of a common law
right to form the marriage relation by words of present assent. A
learned and able writer, having studied the cases, writes, "It has been
established in authority that a marriage good at the common law is
good notwithstanding the existence of any statute on the subject,
unless the statute contains express words of nullity."17 In the Matter
of Hinman, supra, Judge Kellogg says at page 456, "The repeal of
section i9of the law of Igo, ch. 339, shows the changed public policy
of this State and that the legislature became satisfied that the provision making the marriage void unless performed in a particular manner
was against the public good and public morals and that the repeal was
intended and did make common law marriages valid in this State."
This case was affirmed in 2c6 N. Y. 653, but the court of appeals
expressly excepted from its consideration the question of the present
validity of a common law marriage in this state, doubtless because
the question was not involved in the case before it nor its determination essential.
Only one case thus far seems to have construed section i i of the
law of 19oi as amended by section 6 of the law of 1907.11 This case
held that a marriage entered into by written contract as prescribed
by sub-div. 4, section 1i,laws of i9o, as amended by section 6 of the
laws of 1907, ch. 742, was valid, although the contract was not
recorded as prescribed by the statute. Hence it would seem that
section ii amended as aforesaid which is now section i i of the Domestic Relations Law, means that the written contract therein provided
for, "must, in order to be valid" for purposes of evidence, "be acknowledged before a judge of a court of record", and not that the marriage
itself is invalid. Obviously the statute does not contemplate marriage by oral contract.
Only one conclusion can be drawn from the acts of the legislature
and the opinions of the few judges who have had opportunity to
16 Matter of Smith, 74 Misc. (N. Y.) i 1 (1os11); Matter of Hinman, 147 App.

Div. (N. Y.)

452 (1911).

Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation, Section 424.
8Kahn v. Kahn, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 334 (19o8).
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express judicially their construction of the several statutes. The law
of 1896 expressly permitted the common law marriage. This express
permission was repealed by the law of i9o which act further provided,
"That no marriage claimed to have been contracted on or after January 1, 1902, within this State otherwise than in this article provided
shall be valid for any purpose whatever." This express prohibition
was repealed by the law of 1907, leaving the statute silent as to the
validity or invalidity of the common law marriage, the effect of which
was to recognize its validity inferentially. Consistent herewith is the
Matter of Smith, supra, the dictum of Judge Kellogg, supra, and the
case of Kahn v. Kahn, supra, holding that the validity of a marriage,
attempted to be formed by written contract as prescribed by the
statute, was not to be questioned, even though the statute was not
complied with. This evidence leads to the conclusion that the common law marriage by parol contract, has been valid in this state
since the act of 1907 became effective, viz., January 1, 19o8.

Leon A. Plumb.
Negligence: Duty of Municipality as to Icy Sidewalks.-Just how
far a municipality is liable in case of accidents due to the presence
of snow and ice upon sidewalks in winter has been the subject of
much litigation. The question has often arisen as to whether the duty
resting upon the city to keep its sidewalks free from ice and snow
creates an absolute liability in cases of personal injuries arising therefrom, or whether only a reasonable performance of the duty is expected. This latter view is accepted now in practically all jurisdic-2
tions,' so that now in the absence of negligence the city is not liable.
It is interesting, however, to notice just what the different courts
have held to constitute negligence in such cases. It is ordinarily held
that where there was merely a general slippery condition, due to the
natural result of snow and ice forming a smooth coating over the pavement, the city is not liable.3 However, if the snow and ice has been
allowed to accumulate for such a length of time that dangerous ridges
and depressions have been formed, rendering the sidewalk unsafe for
public use, the city is liable,4 although where such an accumulation
has formed but is covered with a new layer of ice and snow and an
injury then occurs upon the new surface before the city would be
chargeable with negligence in not removing it, it will not be liable
2817,

4 Bliss 486; Kleng v. Buf-

Hun (N. Y.) 541 (affirmed 156 N. Y. 700);

Village of Gibson v. John.

'Clark v. City of Chicago, 5 Fed. Cas. No.
falo,

72

son, 4 Ill. App. 288; Rogers v. City of Rome, 96 N. Y. App. Div. 427; Hyler
v. City
of Janesville, 1oI Wis. 371.
2
Harrington v. Buffalo, 121 N. Y. 147; Moran v. New York, 98 N. Y. App.
Div.3 3oi; Kannenberg v. City of Alpena, 96 Mich. 53.
Kinney v. Troy, IO8 N. Y. 567; Anthony v. Village of Glens Falls, 4 N. Y.
App. Div. 218 (affirmed 153 N. Y. 682); Smyth v. City of Bangor, 72 Me. 249;
Lueklng
v. City of Sedalia, I8O Mo. App. 203.
4
Keane v. Village of Waterford, 13o N. Y. r88; Brennan v. New York, 130
App. Div. 267 (affirmed 197 N. Y. 544); Smith v. City of Cloquet, 12o Minn.
5o; Wyman v. Philadelphia, 175 Pa. St. I17; McAuley v. Boston, 113 Mass.
503.
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unless it can be shown that the original condition due to the old
accumulation was a proximate cause of the injury.5
Before the city can be charged with negligence, however, it must
have had reasonable notice of such condition. Accordingly, it has
been held in one jurisdiction6 that the falling of snow was sufficient
to charge the city with notice, while another court has decided that the
passing of five or six days after the snowfall and freezing is necessary 7.
The general rule seems to be that the municipality is not liable unless
the snow and ice have accumulated for a long enough period for the
city by the exercise of reasonable care to have notice. Whether or
not it is contributory negligence .to walk upon a pavement covered
with ice and snow when the pavement on the other side of the street
and all the others about have been cleaned is a question to be left to
the jury.'
It would seem that until recently there was a difference of opinion
in the treatment of this class of cases in the different departments of
the appellate division of the New York supreme court. In the first
department there was a strong tendency to nonsuit in many actions
which would almost certainly have gone to the jury if they had been
brought in the second department. To remedy this condition an
appeal was allowed in the case of Williams v. City of New York, 214
N. Y. 259, and a restatement of the law covering the question as it
exists in New York was made. It would seem that New York is in
line with other jurisdictions on this question and accepts the general
principles of the law affecting the subject. The rule of liability as
propounded in this case states that there are two essentials to recovery
for injuries due to the presence of snow and ice on sidewalks. There
must be shown (i) a dangerous and unusual condition of the street
and (2) the lapse of sufficient time to charge the city with constructive
notice of that condition. In other words, the city is only liable when
it 'allows snow and ice to accumulate in a particular place until it
becomes of a permanent character and a dangerous obstruction to
pedestrians. It is to be noted, however, that this duty resting upon.
the city to keep its sidewalks free from ice and snow, in the absence of
some express provision of statute, does not apply to the same extent
to a crosswalk or crossing of a public street.9 This rule is exceptional
in New York, but it is held so because it is claimed that the removal of
snow and ice at every crossing would materially interfere with the
convenient and practical use of the street for trucking and driving
and for the further reason that, even if the entire removal of snow from
the crossings were desirable, the ordinary travel upon a street necessarily carries more or less snow upon the crosswalk. In any case the
liability of the city is to be founded upon negligence and to determine
5

Durr v. Village of Green Island, 71 Hun (N. Y.) 260; Templin v. City of
127 Iowa 91.
Foxxworthy v. City of Hastings, 25 Neb. 133.
7
See Williams v. City of New York, infra.
8
Twogood v. City of New York, 102 N. Y. 216; Evans v. City of Utica, 69
N. Y.
9 166; Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y. 5o6.
Du Pont v. Village of Port Chester, 204 N. Y. 351.
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this the climate of the locality and the peculiar circumstances surrounding the particular case must be taken into consideration.
Frank B. Ingersoll.
Nuisance Distinguished from Negligence.-In the recent case of
Herman v. City of Buffalo, 214 N. Y. 316, action was brought to
recover damages occasioned by a nuisance which arose from the construction of a building. The injury was due to a failure by the builders to construct in accordance with proper plans. The dangerous
condition was not intended, either actually or inpliedly, and, therefore, it was held that the action sounded not in nuisance, but rather
in negligence.
Nuisance has been defined as anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage', while negligence is primarily the doing of something which a reasonable man would not have done, or the2 omission
to do something which a reasonable man would have done.
The main differences between negligence and nuisance are threefold.
In the first place, the duty to refrain from the commission of a
nuisance is an absolute one.3 The wrong lies in the act itself, the
result or condition complained of, which result is the direct culmination of acts intended by the wrongdoer.4 This does not mean that the
injury resulting was necessarily intended, but that the condition or
act was intended, or else-and here we see a close resemblance to
negligence-the result was one which ought reasonably to have been
expected.
On the other hand, the duty in negligence is not absolute but relative. 6 The duty is that of exercising reasonable care, foresight, and
prudence in performance. And the wrong in negligence is not the act
or condition itself, as it is above, but the way in which the act was
performed or the bondition attained.
The question is not, what is the thing complained of, but, how
was that result brought about?
Secondly, whereas in negligence the degree of care used is allimportant, this is immaterial in nuisance, except where the negligence
is so gross as to imply the intent mentioned above.8 The reason for
this is that, inasmuch as the care taken was ineffective, it must be
considered as immaterial 9. This is true even when the nuisance was
committed in the abatement of another nuisance 0 , or where the business was a lawful one and could not be otherwise conducted".
13 Blackstone Com. 216; Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wendell 397, 398.
2

Lehigh & Wilkes Barre Co. v. Lear, 9 Atl. 267; Ahern v. Co.,
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9Engel
v. Club, 137 N. Y. IOO.
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Herman v. City, 214 N. Y. 316.
5
Herman v. City, 214 N. Y. 316, 325.
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& Maine R. R. v. Sargent, 72 N. H. 455.
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Rosenheimer v. Company, 36 App. Div. i; Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267.
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Clifford v. Dam, 81 N. Y. 52; Congreve v. Smith, I8 N. Y. 79; Herman
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Finally, nuisance implies a positive act,'2 while negligence may
result either from acts of commission or omission"'. In McCluskey v.
Wile, supra, the complaint alleged a nuisance which was "permitted"
to exist, and in Hayes v. R. R., supra, it stated that the objectionable condition was" suffered" to remain. However clearly the wrongs
in these cases amounted to nuisances, it was held that the complaint
alleged negligence, and not nuisance, because the words were words
of omission instead of commission and nuisance is a positive act.
It seems that these decisions conflict with the definitions of some text
writers which define a nuisance as "anything wrongfully done or
permitted which
injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his
4
legal rights."'

The differences between the two are, however, often so slight that
the line of demarcation becomes almost indistinguishable. Especially does this hold true in cases of habitual or protracted negligence. 15
The turntable cases which are referred to as "alluring nuisances"' 16,
are treated as cases of negligence.17
A further illustration is found in a case where employees either
maliciously or carelessly continually threw bits of iron out of a window
to the knowledge of the employer.'8 The first time this would clearly
be a case of negligence. After a month it would have become a
nuisance. The question arises, where shall the line be drawn?
Probably the decision in each case involving the drawing of this
line of demarcation would depend upon its peculiar facts and no
general rule concerning the method of fixing this line could be given.'9
Henry Klauber.
Police Power: Changein Attitude of New York Court of Appeals.It is interesting at this period, when the attention of the legal fraternity is focussed, in a general way at least, upon the growth of a new
social tendency in juristic thought to note how the courts, and
especially the court of appeals of this state, are being affected by the
movement or are affecting it. It is a principle well recognized by
thoughtful lawyers that the decisions of our highest courts are expressions, though sometimes belated, of the dominant social tendencies
of a particular period and locality. Legislatures are noted for their
inconsistency in this respect, as they may be easily prevailed upon to
formulate different types of social legislation and it is only in the
decisions of the courts regarding these statutes that we are able to
spell out the more permanent tendencies of the times.
Constitutional law, and especially that branch of it which deals
with the police power of the state as affecting liberty of person and
12

McCluskey v. Wile, 144 App. Div. 470;. Hayes v. R. R. 2oo N. Y. 183.
Pugh, 54 App. Div. 545.
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Kibele v. City, IO5 Pa. 41; Callan v.
4
Cooley on Torts, 2d edition, p. 670.
5

1 Hogle v. Company, 199 N. Y. 388, 393.
16Burdick
on Torts, 3d ed. p. 525.
1
1R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657.
"8Hogle v. Company, 199 N. Y. 388.
19Snow v. R. R., 136 Mass. 552; Fletcher v. R. R., 168 U. S. 135; Walton v.
Company, 139 Mass. 556.
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contract under the constitution, is the field of law in which these
tendencies show greatest development and in which they may be
most fruitfully studied.
The decision in the recent case of People v. Charles Schweinler
Press, 214 N. Y. 395, is important as marking clearly an epoch in this
development in New York and, if closely followed in the future, will
have a strong and lasting influence upon the effectiveness of this socalled social legislation. The decision, which holds constitutional
a statute forbidding the employment of women in the factories of the
state before six o'clock in the morning or after ten o'clock in the evening, shows a marked change in the attitude of the court regarding the
police power as formerly expressed in People v. Williams, 189 N. Y.
131. The court in that case, in construing a statute similar in all
important respects to the one under consideration in the Press case,
decided it to be unconstitutional as a clear abridgement of the personal
liberty of the individual as guaranteed by both the state and national
constitutions. The alleged ground of distinction between the cases
is of itself indicative of a changed conception on the part of the court
as regards this form of legislation.
is pointed out that since the
decision of the Williams case the report of tthe factory investigating
commission has made it more apparent that night work by women is
injurious to their health and to some extent to their morals. It is
urged that this change, coupled with the fact that the later statute
expressly recites as its purpose the protection of the health and morals
of women, is a sufficient ground of distinction.
It is suggested here that the fact that governing conditions are
better known now than formerly is not a ground of distinction, but is
merely the statement of a reason for a change of opinion on the subject. Practically the same conditions existed at the time of both
decisions, which are only eight years apart, and the fact that they were
not as fully understood at the time of the earlier one does not distinguish the case itself from the later one, but merely furnishes a good
reason for overruling the former decision, whichwas done in substance.
It is also suggested that the recital of purpose in the later statute is
unimportant. The former statute could obviously not have been
passed for any other purpose than that of the later one, as they are
practically identical in their scope and application.
The only important ground of the decision in the Press case, therefore, seems to be that the community, and the court expresses to a
greater or less degree the sentiments of the community, is awakening
to its needs. We are taking a keener interest in the affairs of our
fellow men as we are becoming more mindful of the effect of their
actions upon our own welfare through that of the public.
The position taken by the court in the Press case is a step further
than it has ever advanced, although in the period previous to the
decision of the Williams case it held more liberal views than were
expressed in that case. The Williams case seems to have been a
strong reaction in favor of the individualistic attitude which had been
expressed by several learned judges previously in strong minority
opinions in cases in which there was reason to doubt the constitutionality of the statutes in question.
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In the case of People v. Havnor', a representative case of the
period before the Williams case, the basis of the decision was that the
police power, being necessary to the promotion of the health and welfare of the community, should be exercised by the legislature even
though it involve some sacrifice of natural rights. This liberal attitude resulted during'that period in the cout's declaring constitutional
many important regulatory statutes, among them one compelling
the owners of tenement houses to supply running water, Health
Department v. Rector2 , and one fixing the maximum rate to be
charged for elevating grain, People v. Budd 3. The decision in this
last case is noteworthy, as the statute under consideration could affect
only three of the large cities of the state. It is interesting to note
in this respect that Judge Gray, who wrote the opinion in the Williams
case, dissented from the decisions in both the cases of People v.
Havnor and People v. Budd. The case of In re Jacobs4, which
decided unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the manufacture of
cigars in tenement houses, while an important decision on the general
subject does not reflect seriously upon the comparative liberality of
the period, as the primary test of constitutionality, as to whether the
statute in question would tend to promote the general welfare, was
not sufficiently met. The difficulty encountered in this case will be
obviated if the voters of the state at the next election vote favorably
upon article III, section 29 of the proposed constitution, which reads
"The legislature shall have the power to regulate or prohibit manufacturing in tenement houses."
The completeness of the reaction in the Williams case can be best
illustrated by an extract from the opinion of Judge Gray therein-,
which reads, "The tendency of legislatures, in the form of regulatory
measures, to interfere with the lawful pursuits of citizens is becoming
a marked one in this country, and it behooves the courts, firmly and
fearlessly, to interpose the barriers of their judgments, when invoked
to protect against legislative acts, plainly transcending the powers
conferred by the constitution upon the legislative body."
That the effect of this Press case will be far-reaching is the opinion
of several distinguished legislators, among them Senator Wagner, who
was a member of the factory investigating commission upon the
basis of whose report the decision was partly founded. Senator
Wagner, in commenting in the recent constitutional convention,
upon the proposed amendment to the constitution mentioned above,
said that even cases like the Jacobs case could be easily met in the
future, so great is the advance made in this recent decision 6. Another
distinguished member of the constitutional convention, Mr. Louis
Marshall, the great constitutional lawyer, expressed the view in the
1149
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debates of that body that the Press case constituted a practical overruling of the Williams case.7
Mahlon B. Doing.
Police Power: Constitutionality of Statute Providing for Day of
Rest.-Section 8a of the Labor Law (L. I913, ch. 740), known as the
"One day of rest in seven law," provides with certain exceptions and
qualifications that every employer carrying on any factory or mercantile establishment shall allow every person employed in such
factory or mercantile establishment at least twenty-four consecutive
hours of rest in every seven consecutive days. Its constitutionality
was contested on the ground that it attempted to limit the right of a
male adult to contract for his labor in the pursuits named, violating
art. I, secs. i and 6 of the state constitution and the i4th amendment of the federal constitution. In was held in the recent case of
People v. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y. 121, that as the statute was a
valid exercise of the police power of the state for the promotion of
the public health and welfare, it was constitutional.
The setting apart of any day in the week, Wednesday for instance,
as a day of rest would satisfy the provisions of this statute. It cannot
then be classified as a Sunday law. The court, however, had occasion
to consider and determine an important question relative to the
proper ground upon which to rest the decisions in those cases which
have sustained the constitutionality of a Sunday law. Should a
Sunday law be held constitutional because of the inherent power of
the legislature to promote by legislation the observance of the
Sabbath, thereby encouraging religion, or because the enforcement of
such a law results in a day of rest and recreation, thus promoting the
public health and welfare? The court adopted the latter ground as
the basis of the important decision in the leading case' on the subject,
giving the religious idea a position of secondary importance. Query,
however, whether the prohibition of the many forms of recreation and
amusement upon which the ban of a Sunday law falls promotes the
public health and welfare? The court in the Lindenmuller case and
in Sunday law decisions in general found authority for the recognition
of the principle of one day of rest in seven, and support for the constitutionality of the present statute 2
The police power of a state is, of course, one of the necessary attributes of a civilized government, but there is a limit to its valid exercise. It must be exercised reasonably, and it must be exercised subject to the provisions of both the federal and the state constitutions.
The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote
degree, to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment
valid.3 Is the present statute a reasonable exercise of the police
power? The Lochner case just cited and commonly spoken of as the
"bake-shop case" considered a statute which made it a misdemeanor
7
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for an employer to permit or require employees in bake shops and confectioneries to work more than ten hours a day or sixty hours a week.
Consequently if an employee worked ten hours upon each of six days
he could not be employed upon the seventh. As an enforcement of its
provisions would thus invariably result in a day of rest, it was very
similar in effect to the statute considered in the principal case. The
United States Supreme Court held that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of a state, but an unreasonable,
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and liberty of
the individual to contract for his labor and therefore in conflict with
the i 4 th amendment and unconstitutional. This was a reversal of4
the decision of the New York court of appeals in the same case.
The court, however, in the principal case distinguished the Lochner
case on the ground that the law in the latter case not only limited the
amount of labor to be performed in seven days, like the statute under
discussion, but that it also contained the added provision that no
employee should be allowed to work in excess of a certain number of
hours during any day and that the condemnation was directed
against this feature of the limitation.
It is submitted that this distinction is not sound. The court in
the Lochner case does not appear to have condemned any particular
feature of the statute. Instead its decision seems to have been
directed against the spirit and purpose of the whole statute. It was
apparently unable to find anything in the business of baking which
could be considered so detrimental to the health of those employed
therein as to warrant upon the grounds of protecting the public health
any limitation whatsoever of the right to contract for labor in this
employment. The court then concluded that there was no justification for this interference with the freedom of contract. This is the
true basis of the decision in that case. It will therefore be of great
interest to see how the United States Supreme Court, confronted by
the Lochner case, will settle, if it has occasion to do so, the question as to the constitutionality of this "One day of rest in seven law,"
now under discussion. Whereas the statute considered in the Lochner case, and held unconstitutional because it could not be justified as
a health measure, affected only the business of baking, which business
might easily be considered an unhealthy occupation, this present
statute affects all factories and all mercantile establishments regardless
of whether or not they are in their nature dangerous and detrimental
to the health of those employed therein. It is therefore very difficult
to perceive how the court will sustain this statute as one protecting the
public health and at the same time maintain a line of reasoning consistent with that followed in the Lochner case. The statute may
possibly be declared unconstitutional upon the same grounds as set
forth in the Lochner case.
Selby G. Smith.
4
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